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INTRODUCTION
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ...
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations."I This broad statutory language has enabled U.S. agencies and
courts to apply the Sherman Act extraterritorially, including to cartels organized
outside the United States.2 Recently, the major cross-border cartel investigations
initiated by the Department of Justice into price fixing in air cargo, auto parts,
liquid crystal display panels, and freight forwarding, as well as investigations
into the manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate and foreign
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong. I am grateful for comments from Song
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1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added).
2. See Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1501, 1506-
1508 (1998); see generally John A. Trenor, Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application ofAntitrust
Laws after Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1583 (1995).
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exchange rates, have all focused on foreign cartel conduct.3
However, the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act is not without
limits.4 Indeed, the extent to which U.S. courts should enforce antitrust laws
against State-led export cartels has been the subject of intense debate among
academics, courts, and policymakers for decades.5 Defendants in such cartel
cases have often argued that their conduct was compelled by foreign
governments, and these cases have therefore turned on fact-specific inquiries into
the reach and meaning of foreign laws and foreign sovereign involvement in the
cartels.6 The underlying rationale for such a defense is comity, a foundational
doctrine applied by U.S. courts to recognize an individual's act under foreign
law out of respect for foreign sovereigns.7 Although comity has been frequently
invoked in cases involving conflict of laws with foreign nations, courts and
commentators have bemoaned its ambiguity and inconsistent application.8 Thus
far, courts have tried in vain to set a benchmark for determining whether a
foreign sovereign's involvement has reached a level that constitutes
compulsion.9 With the growing integration of the world economy and the rise of
3. Kirby D. Behre et al., International Cartel Investigations in the United States, GLOBAL
INVESTIGATION REV. (Aug. 9, 2017), https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/benchmarking/the-
investigations-review-of-the-americas-2018/1145426/international-cartel-investigations-in-the-united-
states.
4. Guzman, supra note 2, at 1508 ("Extraterritoriality is, of course, a question of degree.").
5. See Jane Lee, Note, Vitamin "C" is for Compulsion: Delimiting the Foreign Sovereign
Compulsion Defense, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 757, 759 (2010); Marek Martyniszyn, Foreign State's
Entanglement in Anticompetitive Conduct, 40 WORLD COMPETITION 299, 306-07 (2017); Spencer Weber
Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 564 (2000).
6. Lee notes that courts have used a variety of proxies to determine whether a foreign
sovereign's involvement has reached a level that constitutes compulsion, including:
[T]he existence of a foreign law that mandated the defendant's behavior, the validity of the
order or defensibility of the defendant's action under foreign law, and the presence of a foreign
sovereign's statements on the issue of compulsion. Courts have looked at one or more of these
factors but have reached ivergent conclusions, resulting in a lack of clear, instructive guidance
on the foreign sovereign compulsion defense.
Lee, supra note 5, at 759.
7. See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (Vitamin CI11), 837 F.3d 175, 183-86 (2d Cir. 2016);
Joel R. Paul, The Transformation ofInternational Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 19 (2008).
("Roughly speaking, courts, according to this doctrine, should apply foreign law or limit domestic
jurisdiction out of respect for foreign sovereignty. International comity requires courts to balance
competing public and private interests in a manner that takes into account any conflict between the public
policies of the domestic and foreign sovereigns." (citation omitted)).
8. See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as
Conflict ofLaws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 13 (2010) ("The doctrine of international comity is one of
the most important, and yet least understood, international law cannons employed by U.S. courts in
transnational cases." (footnotes omitted)); William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2072 (2015) ("For a principle that plays such a central role in U.S. foreign relations
law, international comity is surrounded by a surprising amount of confusion."); Louise Weinberg, Against
Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 53 (1991) ("The misleading word 'comity' has been responsible for much of the
trouble. It has been fertile in suggesting a discretion unregulated by general principles." (quoting Loucks
v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201-02 (N.Y. 1918))).
9. See Benjamin G. Bradshaw et al., Foreign Sovereignty and U.S. Antitrust Enforcement: Is
"The State Made Me Do It" A Viable Defense, 26 ANTITRUST 19, 20 (2012) ("But there remains a
considerable degree of uncertainty surrounding what defendants must show to satisfy the [foreign
sovereign compulsion] defense, as well as how they might show it."); Lee, supra note 5, at 790 ("Over
the course of several decades, courts have struggled to define the limits of the foreign sovereign
compulsion defense, resulting in a lack of clear, consistent guidance on the application of the doctrine.").
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state capitalism in emerging countries,10 the issue has become more prominent
than ever.
The Vitamin C Case, a recent Supreme Court decision involving a number
of Vitamin C exporters from China, highlights these challenges.I' This case dates
back to 2005, when a group of U.S. purchasers of Chinese-manufactured
Vitamin C alleged that the Chinese manufacturers' swift rise to dominance in the
global Vitamin C market had been facilitated by collusion among the
manufacturers (the defendants).12 The Chinese defendants did not deny the
allegations but moved to dismiss the suit on the basis that they should be exempt
from antitrust liability since they had been compelled by the Chinese government
to fix prices and limit output.13 In an unprecedented move, the Ministry of
Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) filed an amicus brief
in support of the Chinese defendants, acknowledging that the Chinese
government had compelled the cartel's activities.14 MOFCOM claimed that the
trade association that facilitated the cartel was actually an entity under the
government's direct and active supervision.'5 However, after lengthy pre-trial
discovery, the district court refused to defer to MOFCOM's interpretation of
Chinese law.16 The Second Circuit reversed the decision of the lower court and
afforded conclusive weight to the statements by the Chinese government.17 The
plaintiffs appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which subsequently granted
certiorari. On June 14, 2018, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in which it
held that although U.S. courts should accord respectful consideration to a foreign
government's submissions, they are not bound to such submissions.'8
On the surface, the Supreme Court appears to have decided the case solely
by focusing on whether to treat the statements by a foreign sovereign as
conclusive. In doing so, it adopted a legalistic and formalistic approach by
heavily relying on a provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In this
Article, I propose an alternative interpretation: the underlying driver of the
Supreme Court's decision was not law, but politics. Indeed, the Supreme Court
proactively solicited the opinion of the executive branch before hearing the case
and its final ruling was exactly in line with the opinions and suggestions
proposed by the government. It is clear that the Supreme Court and the Executive
spoke with one voice. The Supreme Court's decision in the Vitamin C Case
therefore raises a number of interesting questions: why did the Court refuse to
treat MOFCOM's statements as conclusive evidence of Chinese law? What
explains the high level of deference the Court has accorded to the executive
10. The Rise of State Capitalism, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2012),
https://www.economist.corn/leaders/2012/01/21/the-rise-of-state-capitalism.
11. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018).
12. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 548-50 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (addressing
plaintiffs' suit under Section I of the Sherman Act and Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act).
13. Id. at 550.
14. Id. at 552.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 557.
17. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (Vitamin CIIl), 837 F.3d 175, 194 (2d Cir. 2016).
18. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1869 (2018).
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branch? More generally, how should courts apply comity analysis when the
factual evidence is ambiguous? What is the implication of the Supreme Court's
decision and how might it affect other international comity cases?
In this Article, I seek to answer the above questions by incorporating
insights from game theory. To illustrate the dynamics between the importing and
exporting countries, I model their interactions as a sequential game. In this game,
the optimal strategy of the United States is contingent on the strategy of the
exporting country, whose strategy in turn is dependent on both the United States'
and the exporting country's own domestic politics and trade policies. Notably,
in previous cases, courts have often overlooked such complex dynamics between
trade and antitrust. They have instead focused only on the antitrust issue,
particularly the factual evidence of foreign sovereign involvement in the export
cartel. However, as is often the case, facts are very difficult to obtain and verify,
and there has been a lack of consensus among courts about the conditions under
which a foreign sovereign's involvement in a cartel would rise to the level of
compulsion. More importantly, the judicial focus on facts alone tends to obscure
the fundamental question of whether important American interests justify U.S.
courts' deference to foreign interests. Comity analysis needs to take place in the
specific context of State-led export cartels, where antitrust law issues are
intertwined with trade policy and domestic politics in both the exporting and
importing countries. Thus, whether a U.S. court should accept the comity defense
should depend on the specific circumstances of the particular case, taking into
consideration the interests of all players involved and the strategic nature of their
decision-making. Since the executive branch is in the best position to consider
and balance the competing interests, it makes sense for U.S. courts to accord a
high level of deference to the Executive.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I first sets the stage by explaining
why the anti-dumping policy of importing countries is often the impetus behind
the organization of export cartels by foreign sovereigns. Part II then explains
how the U.S. executive branch has weighed trade and antitrust remedies in
dealing with export cartels and, in fact, has even encouraged export cartels to
facilitate trade policy. To illustrate the challenges faced by courts in dealing with
export cartel cases, Part III introduces the background of the Vitamin C litigation,
the opinions of all three levels of the federal courts, and related trade and antitrust
cases. Part IV elaborates on why judicial focus on facts alone could be misguided
and contends that courts should instead accord a high degree of deference to the
executive branch when factual evidence proves to be ambiguous. The last Part
then concludes and draws out the implications of this study.
I. THE IMPETUS FOR EXPORT CARTELS
While cartels are consistently outlawed in established competition law
regimes, virtually all jurisdictions tolerate export cartels. For instance, the Webb-
Pomerene Act expressly allows export cartels that operate xclusively in foreign
284 [Vol. 44: 2
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markets.9 Under the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, U.S. firms can apply
in advance for certifications to exempt their export cartels from antitrust laws in
the United States.2 0 The incentive for exporting countries to exempt export
cartels is obvious: consumer welfare loss is borne by consumers from the
importing countries, while the producers from the exporting countries reap the
gains of monopoly rents. 21 Since export cartels pose a classic externality
problem for the open economy, the benefits of international cooperation are
22substantial. However, industrialized States have tried in vain to reach such an
agreement and, hitherto, the World Trade Organization (WTO) does not have a
mandate to deal with export cartels.23
In cases concerning State-led export cartels, antitrust issues are often
entangled with trade policy issues. In particular, anti-dumping law prohibits
imports sold at less than fair value if the imports would materially injure a
domestic industry.24 Anti-dumping law condemns low pricing in order to shield
domestic industries from foreign competition, while antitrust law protects
consumer interests by encouraging low pricing. 25 Thus, anti-dumping not only
creates a trading tension but also tension with domestic antitrust policy. 26 As
such, the conflict we observe between a foreign exporting country's trade policy
and U.S. antitrust law is deeply rooted in the internal tension between U.S.
antitrust law and its domestic anti-dumping measures. Indeed, when a foreign
government creates a single-country export cartel, profit maximization may be
only one of the driving factors. A foreign government might react to the anti-
dumping measures of the importing country by imposing export restraints or
encouraging domestic firms to agree among themselves to restrict output or raise
prices.
The Chinese vitamin C industry offers a good example. Anti-dumping is
one of the major risks that China faces in participating in the world trade
system.27 Since China's entry into the WTO in 2001, China has become one of
28
the most important players in world trade. But the exponential growth in
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982); see also John F. McDernid, The Antitrust Commission and the
Webb-Pomerene Act: A Critical Assessment, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 105 (1980) (elaborating on the
exemption).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994).
21. Alan 0. Sykes, Externalities in Open Economy Antitrust and Their Implications for
International Competition Policy, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 92 (1999).
22. Id at 94.
23. See generally Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA J. INT'L
L. 911 (2003);. Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust and International Regulatory Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1142 (2001); D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of
International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 37 (2007).
24. See, e.g., Wentong Zheng, Trade Law's Response to the Rise of China, 34 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 109, 115 (2016) ("Article VI of GATT 1947 defines dumping as the introduction of one country's
products into the commerce of another country at 'less than its normal value' of the products." (citation
omitted)).
25. Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of
Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 24 (1995).
26. Id at 24-25.
27. Chad P. Brown, China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement, in
CHINA'S GROWING ROLE IN FREE TRADE 281, 286-87 (Robert C. Feenstra &.Shang-Jin Wei eds., 2010).
28. Zheng, supra note 24, at 110.
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Chinese exports has also dealt a blow to the world trade system, causing massive
job losses for importing countries.29 Meanwhile, excess capacity is a perennial
challenge facing the Chinese economy.3 0 Since the mid-1990s, there has been
excess capacity in sixty-one of China's ninety-four major categories of industrial
products and the capacity utilization rate has been below fifty percent in thirty-
five of them. 31 A natural consequence of the excess capacity is "excessive
competition." 32 The intense price competition among Chinese exporters has
sparked accusations from foreign counties that Chinese companies are dumping
their goods into foreign markets. 33 This has led to a spate of foreign anti-
dumping actions against Chinese exporters.34 From 2002 to June 2011, China
had been the target of twenty-one W.T.O. complaints. To tackle the problem
of overcapacity, the Chinese government has implemented a number of industrial
policy measures.36 Most of these measures have taken the form of "industrial
self-discipline," whereby major companies in a specific industr reach
agreements to limit competition in order to stabilize the economy. Trade
associations, many of which are converted from government ministries, play a
pivotal role in facilitating such cartels.3 8
In 2003, the Chinese government imposed a requirement that obliged
exporters of thirty-six goods to submit their export contracts to their respective
trade associations for approval before export. According to MOFCOM, the
main reason for imposing this new requirement was to "make active efforts to
avoid anti-dumping sanctions imposed by foreign countries on China's
exports."40 Vitamin C is one of these goods.41 According to the judicial record
in the Vitamin C Case, China's share of vitamin exports to the United States rose
42
from sixty percent in 1997 to eighty percent by 2002. And the defendants in
the Vitamin C Case themselves achieved more than a sixty percent share in the
29. Id. at 111.
30. Wentong Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic Transition, Market Structure,
and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 643, 675-77 (2010).
31. Id.
32. Bruce M. Owen et al., China's Competition Policy Reforms: The Anti-Monopoly Law and
Beyond, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 231, 247-49 (2008).
3 3. Id.
34. Dingding Tina Wang, When Antitrust Met WTO: Why U.S. Courts Should Consider US.-
China WTO Disputes in Deciding Antitrust Cases Involving Chinese Exporters, 1121 COLUM. L. REv.
1096, 1100-01 (2012).
35. Id at 1111.
36. See Fagaiwei: Wu Da Cuoshi Ezhi Weishengsu C Channeng Guosheng [Development and
Reform Commission: Five Measures to Curb Excess Capacity of Vitamin C], CHINA NEWS NET (Dec. 30,
2009), http://finance.ifeng.com/news/industry/20091230/1648112.shtml (noting excess capacity in the
vitamin C industry); see also Owen et al., supra note 32, at 249 (describing government-supervised price
agreements among key industry players to avoid anti-dumping investigations).
37. See Owen et al., supra note 32, at 248-49; see also Zheng, supra note 30, at 687-91.
38. See Owen et al., supra note 32, at 249.
39. Id. (citing MOFCOM and Customs Authority Circular 36 of 2003, Advance Approval
Requirement for the Export of Thirty-Six Goods, Nov. 29, 2003, http://wwwl.customs.gov.
cn/Default.aspxTabID=433&InfolD)-1070&SettingModulelD=1427).
40. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (Vitamin C11), 837 F.3d 175, 181 (2d Cir. 2016).
41. See Fagaiwei, supra note 36.
42. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (Vitamin C1l), 810 F. Supp. 2d 522, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
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worldwide market in 2001.43 At that time, there was growing concern within the
Chinese government that Western countries would soon adopt anti-dumping
measures against Chinese Vitamin C products.4 Thus, the Chinese government
faced a dilemma: if it regulated the exports of Chinese products, it risked both
exposing Chinese exporters to antitrust suits for price fixing in the United States
and violating the GATT commitments by imposing such export restraints. If, on
the other hand, the Chinese government did not regulate the exports, there would
likely be excessive competition among domestic exporters, thus exposing the
Chinese exporters to potential anti-dumping allegations from the United States.
As the Vitamin C Case ultimately revealed, the Chinese government
decided to take actions to coordinate the Vitamin C exports. 45 However, the
potential trade violations that China might be mired in may explain why the
46
Chinese government did not impose any mandatory rules or regulations.
Rather, MOFCOM delegated some of its regulatory authority to a chamber of
commerce with an ambiguous legal status. 47 This seems to be a deliberate tactic
by China to conceal its role in coordinating the export cartels. The chamber
publicly promoted itself as an independent and non-governmental organization.
By contrast, in its amicus brief defending the Vitamin C producers, MOFCOM
described the chamber as an instrument through which it oversaw and regulated
the export business. 48
Notably, China is not the first country to use export cartels to address
overcapacity problems. In the late 1970s, the Japanese government adopted a
program of adjustment assistance for its distressed industries. One of its primary
tools for adjustment-in use since 1953-remains the cartelization of such
industries.49 At that time, Japanese exports were heavily cartelized. In 1977,
there were eighty-six officially registered export cartels, accounting for twenty
to thirty percent of all exports from Japan.5 By the mid-1980s, the Japanese
government had established sixty-four separate cartel systems authorized by
forty-six separate cartel exemption statutes.5 Like the Chinese government, the
Japanese government believed that cartels were an effective way to eliminate
excess capacity by allowing troubled companies to collaborate in solving their
mutual problems.52
As the anti-dumping measures imposed by the importing countries are
often the impetus for the foreign sovereign to coordinate export cartels, the
importing country will need to carefully consider whether to launch antitrust
43. Id.
44. Id. at 527.
45. See infra Part III.
46. Vitamin CII, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
47. Id.
48. Id
49. Akinori Uesugi, Japan's Cartel System and Its Impact on International Trade, 27 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 389, 389-390 (1986).
50. See Marek Martyniszyn, Export Cartel: Is it Legal to Target Your Neighbour?: Analysis In
Light ofRecent Case Law, 15 J. INT'LECON. L. 181, 217 (2012).
51. Uesugi, supra note 49, at 401.
52. Id. at 391.
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actions against such cartels in the first place since they can potentially conflict
with the domestic trade policy. These political dynamics behind State-led export
cartels are examined in the next Part.
II. THE POLrIcs BEHIND EXPORT CARTELS
The United States has considered both antitrust and trade remedies when
dealing with export cartels, especially in its litigation with China. This Part
explores how the U.S. government has used antitrust as a strategic tool for trade
policy, focusing on the Japanese xport cartel cases in the 1980s.
A. Weighing Trade and Antitrust
When dealing with export cartels, the United States generally has two
options: it can seek help via a multilateral treaty network such as the WTO or
through direct diplomatic negotiations with the foreign sovereign or,
alternatively, it can bring antitrust actions against the foreign producers. The
former is arguably a more efficient mechanism for resolution. First, although
antitrust litigation in the United States can be initiated by both public and private
actors, it can produce inefficient results. Private enforcement of antitrust
litigation will likely involve piecemeal, decentralized, and uncoordinated efforts
that aim to maximize plaintiffs' gains from litigation rather than the social
welfare of the United States. Second, antitrust cases often involve lengthy
discovery, thus heavily straining judicial resources. In comparison, the
management of trade cases is coordinated and centralized by the U.S. executive
branch, and these cases are usually resolved much more quickly through the
WTO proceedings than through antitrust lawsuits.
At the same time, trade and antitrust are mutually exclusive remedies. The
success of a WTO proceeding hinges on proving China's imposition of export
restraints, whereas the success of an antitrust proceeding hinges on proving the
absence of any government restraint (i.e., that the cartel is voluntary). In the
Vitamin C Case, the United States did not directly challenge China's trading
practice. Instead, the U.S. government filed a complaint with the WTO in 2009
alleging that the Chinese government had imposed export restraints on a number
of raw materials.5 3 In its WTO case, the U.S. Trade Representative used
MOFCOM's amicus brief in the Vitamin C litigation as evidence of the latter's
trade violations. Therefore, a U.S. court holding that the Vitamin C cartel was
voluntary would contradict the position of the U.S. Trade Representative and
risk undermining the United States' case at the WTO. As it turned out, the United
States won the raw materials case in the WTO proceeding even though the
appellate panel voided the findings about MOFCOM's amicus brief and decided
the case based upon other evidence.54 With the trade claims settled, the U.S.
courts did not have to worry about the spillover effects of this antitrust decision
53. See infra Section III(B).
54. See Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials, J¶ 226-35, 362-63, WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R (Jan. 30, 2011).
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on the United States' trade claims.
Further, as China abandoned its export restraints on Vitamin C products in
2008, the United States no longer had an interest in going after China via trade
remedies. Nor did the United States have an interest in raising Vitamin C prices
to protect domestic producers from foreign competition, as the market was
already dominated by Chinese producers.55 Nonetheless, domestic antitrust
litigation is not free from controversy as U.S. courts denying immunity to
Chinese vitamin manufacturers may have serious implications for foreign
relations.
After the district court in the Vitamin C Case refused to defer to the
MOFCOM statements, the Chinese government made several official statements
to the U.S. government and U.S. courts, reiterating that the U.S. government
should respect comity. In 2013, Shang Ming, the Director General of the Anti-
Monopoly Bureau of MOFCOM, expressed "deep dissatisfaction" with the
district court's ruling, which he believed "show[ed] disrespect for China."57
Shang Ming termed the verdict "unfair," "inappropriate," and "wrong," and
reportedly stated that if the verdict stands, "the international community will
have. concerns, and eventually rising disputes may in turn hurt the interests of the
United States."5 8 These comments sent a message to the United States that a
refusal to defer to MOFCOM's statements could lead to more disputes between
the two nations, which could have adverse consequences on their relationship.
Indeed, the Second Circuit appeared to believe that refusing to defer to the
Chinese government could have provoked retaliation and resulted in a worse
outcome for the United States.59 Thus, by deciding to defer to the Chinese
government, the appellate court dispensed with the need to adopt an intensive,
fact-specific approach. Deference to the Chinese government's interpretation of
its own law became a shortcut for the court to reach its preferred outcome. Yet
the U.S. government held a different view. In its amicus brief submitted to the
U.S. Supreme Court, the Solicitor General and the U.S. Department of Justice
argued that "unlike a statement from the [e]xecutive [b]ranch, a foreign
sovereign's objection to a suit does not, in itself, necessarily indicate that the
case will harm U.S. foreign relations."60 This suggests that the U.S. executive
branch did not believe that MOFCOM's protest to the previous Vitamin C
55. Annie Harrison-Dunn, Made in China: DSM Talks Vitamin C Price Pressures, NUTRA
INGREDIANTS.COM (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.nutraingredients.com/Article/2016/
0 2/17/Made-in-
China-DSM-talks-vitamin-C-price-pressures (explaining that eighty-five to ninety-five percent of the
vitamin C was produced in China).
56. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (Vitamin C11), 837 F.3d 175, 193-94 (2d Cir. 2016).
57. Client Memorandum, Davis Polk, Chinese Vitamin C Producers Price-Fixing Verdict Raises
Questions of Comity and Conflict with Executive Branch Views (Mar. 27, 2013),
https://www.davispolk.com/files/files/Publication/2d3d3 1c8-75b6-47be-8ef1 -
02074549087e/Preview/PublicationAttachment/337beb4c-724d-48b2-9a7f-
11a26184cdcf/032713.Vitamin.C.pdf (internal quotations omitted).
58. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
59. Vitamin C III, 837 F.3d at 193-94.
60. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 20, In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (Vitamin C11), 837 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 16-
1220) [hereinafter United States' Amicus Brief in Vitamin C Case].
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decisions was a credible threat to the foreign relations between the two countries.
In the late 1990s, U.S. federal agencies cracked down on a large global
vitamin cartel, ending a decade-long conspiracy among major vitamin
producers,61 and demonstrating that the United States has long endorsed a
vigorous antitrust policy in the vitamin industry. In light of its previous law
enforcement efforts, it is not surprising that the U.S. executive branch criticized
the Second Circuit for giving "inadequate weight to the interests of the U.S.
victims of the alleged price-fixing cartel and to the interests of the United States
in enforcement of its antitrust law." 62
As the analysis above reveals, the executive branch's plea that the Supreme
Court not grant conclusive deference to MOFCOM's statements is firmly
grounded in the specific circumstances of the Vitamin C Case. Since trade
remedies were not desirable in the Vitamin C Case, it is natural that the United
States leaned on antitrust remedies. But if the Executive were to decide that it
was in the United States' best interest to resolve the conflict via the trade route,
then it would seem best to refrain from suing the Chinese manufacturers on the
basis of conflicting antitrust grounds. In fact, it would make sense for the U.S.
federal courts to stay the antitrust action, pending the resolution of the trade
dispute, as was done in Resco Products. 63 Under such circumstances, the
executive branch would have greater incentive to nudge the court towards
granting immunity to the Chinese exporters, regardless of whether the Chinese
government had filed an amicus brief in the litigation. Thus, contrary to the
Second Circuit's decision in the Vitamin C litigation, a foreign government's
appearance in court is neither necessary nor sufficient for affording a comity-
based defense to the foreign exporters, since such a defense ultimately turns on
the specific circumstances of a case. As the U.S. response to the Japanese xport
cartel in the 1980s will illustrate, under certain circumstances, the executive
branch may even encourage foreign export cartels into the United States to
address intractable trade problems.
B. Using Antitrust as a Toolfor Trade Policy
Export cartels in general act as an externality for importing countries and
harm their consumers. All else being equal, the importing country will be better
off imposing import restraints (such as tariffs or import quotas) on the goods
rather than allowing the export cartels. This is because in the case of export
61. The largest vitamin C producers were all severely sanctioned in a crackdown on the global
cartel by U.S. regulators in the late 1990s. See David Barboza, Tearing Down the Fagade of 'Vitamins
Inc.', N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/10/business/tearing-down-the-
facade-of-vitamins-inc.html; see also John M. Connor, The Great Global Vitamins Conspiracy: Sanctions
and Deterrence 43-44 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 06-02, 2006) (suggesting that at that time
the largest vitamin C producers were European firms).
62. See United States' Amicus Brief in Vitamin C Case, supra note 60, at 20.
63. Resco Prod., Inc. v. Bosai Minerals Grp., No. CIV.A. 06-235, 2010 WL 2331069, at *3, 6
(W.D. Pa. June 4, 2010).
64. Michael William Lochmann, The Japanese Voluntary Restraint on Automobile Exports: An
Abandonment ofFree Trade Principles ofGA TT and the Free Market Principles of United States Antitrust
Laws, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 99, 113-14 (1986).
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cartels, the increased rent accrues to the foreign producers, whereas the
importing country can recoup some of the loss of consumer welfare from the
revenue of tariffs or duties levied on foreign producers.6 5 Despite their harm to
consumers, export cartels can potentially benefit domestic producers. During a
trade crisis, the government may feel the pressure to protect domestic producers
from foreign competition. Since the 1960s, the U.S. executive branch has
negotiated a number of voluntary restraint agreements as a means of resolving
certain complicated trade problems, which have the effect of encouraging foreign
export cartels.66 In fact, such tactics were used very widely in the 1980s, during
the trade war between Japan and the United States, as elaborated below.
1. The Japanese Export Cartel
In the 1980s, the U.S. automobile industry faced severe challenges from
Japanese imports.67 The Japanese auto manufacturers quickly expanded into the
U.S. market, gaining a nearly twenty-four percent market share by early 1981.
Meanwhile, the three largest 'U.S. auto makers all experienced financial
hardships, with production and sales declining dramatically.69 Unemployment in
the auto industry soared-over 300,000 auto workers became jobless, as did
another 500,000 working in the auto supply industries.70 The economic threat
posed by the rising tide of Japanese imports led to intensive lobbying from the
auto manufacturers and their unions, who petitioned for relief from Japanese
71
imports.
However, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), which serves as
an advisory body to the President and Congress on trade issues, denied the
industry's petition.72 In a close decision (three to two), the majority found that
although foreign imports had significantly injured the domestic industry, they
were not the primary cause of the industry's problems. 7 Rather, they attributed
the industry's failures to other factors, such as economic recession and the shift
in consumer demand for smaller cars.74 At the same time, Congress threatened
to impose a legislative quota on Japanese auto imports, a move that would have
violated the United States' obligations under GATT. 75 President Reagan, who
had publicly endorsed free trade and the free market, succumbed to the pressures
of Congress to protect domestic industries from Japanese competition at the
76
expense of U.S. consumers. Yet without a positive ITC decision, President
65. Id.
66. Spencer Weber Waller, The Ambivalence of United States Antitrust Policy Towards Single-
Country Export Cartel, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 98, 106-09 (1999).
67. Lochmann, supra note 64, at 100-04.
68. Id. at 101.
69. Id. at 100.
70. Id. at 101.
71. Id. at 101.
72. Id. at 102-03.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 103.
76. Id. at 104.
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Reagan lacked the statutory authority to impose trade restraints.77 The Reagan
Administration came up with an awkward solution: to convince the Japanese
government to voluntarily limit their exports. Such a solution would satisfy the
domestic political demand without violating the GATT obligations.7 9
The Japanese government, on the other hand, was faced with a dilemma. It
could either choose to impose export restraints and extract more profits from
U.S. consumers, or it could choose to take no action and let the Japanese
manufacturers continue to compete and expand into the U.S. market, in which
case Congress would likely impose stringent quotas on Japanese imports.80 The
former option was obviously more desirable to Japan, except that with voluntary
export restraints (VER), Japan risked violating its obligations under GATT and
could also face antitrust lawsuits in the United States. 81 But since it was the U.S.
government that requested the VER from Japan, the United States would not
challenge Japan under GATT.82 Thus, the only remaining concern for the
Japanese government was the risk of antitrust violations. During rounds of
discussion, the Japanese government sought assurance from the Reagan
Administration that their VER system would not amount to violations of U.S.
antitrust law. 83 In a response to a letter from the Japanese Ambassador in May
1981, then-U.S. Attorney General William French Smith replied that the
Department of Justice believed that the VER system would be "viewed as having
been compelled by the Japanese government" and thus "would not give rise to
violations of United States antitrust laws."84 Moreover, Smith gave assurances
that the Department of Justice believed that American courts' interpretation of
the antitrust laws would likely persist in exempting the VER system from
antitrust violations.85
From a game theory perspective, the negotiation between the United States
and Japan could be modeled as a Nash bargaining problem. A key determinant
of a Nash bargaining solution is the outside option-that is, the payoffs for the
parties in the event that the negotiation breaks down.87 To illustrate the two
parties' outside options, Figure 1 models the two countries' interaction outside
of bargaining as a sequential game. This game has two players: the importing
country (the United States) and the exporting country (Japan). In this game, the
two countries take turns in making their moves, and each country can observe
the move of the other country before making its next move. Thus, each country
must consider how the other country will respond if it makes a particular move,
77. Id.
78. Idat 104-05.
79. Id at 104, 130.
80. See id. at 104-07.
81. Id. at 130. Although the European Union could have potentially challenged Japan under
GATT as well, that did not happen.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 104-07.
84. Id.atl07n.65.
85. Id.
86. John F. Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950); see also AVINASH
DIXIT ET AL., GAMEs OF STRATEGY 666-72 (2015).
87. Nash, supra note 86 at 158.
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which will in turn affect their own future actions. Each country decides its
current move based on the calculation of future consequences.
Figure 1: The Game Between the United States and Japan
Japan
Imposes VER No VER
Japanese firms are
challenged on No antitrust
antitrust grounds suit (1-p)
(p)
(0, -i)
United States United States







Upon the threat of trade sanctions from the United States, the Japanese
government is confronted with two choices: it can impose an export VER
(equivalent to organizing an export cartel), or it can impose no restraint on
exports and let the free market run its course. If Japan imposes a VER, Japanese
firms become vulnerable to antitrust allegations from the United States. To keep
things simple, the model assumes that if the Japanese government imposes a
VER, the likelihood of the Japanese firms being challenged in the United States
for antitrust violations is p ( assuming p > 0.5). 8 The United States then itself
has two options: the government could either grant antitrust immunity on comity
grounds or deny such immunity.89 On the other hand, if the Japanese government
does not impose a VER, the model assumes that Japanese firms will continue to
compete fiercely and expand into the U.S. market, and that Congress will impose
trade sanctions on Japanese auto imports. For the sake of simplicity, the model
also assumes the payoffs to the parties based on the factual circumstances at the
time.90
To determine its optimal strategy, the United States will presumably look
88. The Japanese firms could be challenged by private or public enforcers in the United States.
There is, of course, a possibility that the Japanese firms' collusive conduct is never caught. We assume
here that the firms are more likely to be challenged for antitrust violations than not.
89. To make things simple we assume both the U.S. courts and the U.S. public enforcement
agencies will share the same view as to whether to grant immunity to the Japanese firms.
90. The payoff to Japan is listed on the left and the payoff to the United States is listed on the
right.
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ahead and reason back to anticipate the Japanese government's reactions in this
game. If the United States denies immunity, the total expected payoff to Japan
will be (p * -2) + ((1-p) * 0) = -2p. As p > 0.5, the total expected payoff to Japan
will be less than -1. In that circumstance, the Japanese government would be
better off not imposing a VER in the first place. On the other hand, if the United
States grants immunity, the payoff to Japan is higher if it imposes a VER, as it
will be able to obtain higher profits from trade and avoid potential trade sanctions
from the U.S. Congress. The Japanese government would choose to impose a
VER in this circumstance.
Now that we know how Japan will move if given the chance, we can
truncate the decision tree and eliminate the strategy that we know Japan will not
adopt-that is, Japan will not impose a VER if the United States denies
immunity. The consequences for the United States, of granting or not granting
immunity, is then quite apparent. Clearly, the United States would prefer to grant
immunity, as it will receive a higher payoff than if Congress imposes anctions
on Japanese firms. Note that such a choice is valid regardless of the United
States' payoff if it denies immunity. Even if the United States' payoffs are higher
if it denies immunity than if it grants immunity, the United States would still be
better off granting immunity because otherwise, the Japanese firms would not
impose a VER in the first place.
As shown in Figure 1, if both the United States and Japan do rollback
analysis to choose their optimal strategies, the equilibrium entails the Japanese
government imposing a VER and the United States granting immunity to the
Japanese government. While this strategy will yield the best payoffs for both
countries under this sequential game, they both have an interest in avoiding the
cost and uncertainties of engaging in protracted and costly antitrust disputes
further down the road. In other words, there is an excess value to be gained from
the bargaining between these two countries, and the surplus from cooperation is
obvious. To reach an agreement, Japan needed to receive an assurance from the
Reagan Administration that the U.S. government would grant immunity and that
U.S. courts would follow suit. The letter from the Department of Justice to the
Japanese government served this exact purpose; without this commitment, the
two countries would not have been able to reach a cooperative outcome.
With the blessings of the Reagan Administration, the Japanese auto VER
lasted almost four years from 1981 until 1985.91 Partly due to the restrictions of
the Japanese imports, the United States auto industry experienced a dramatic
recovery and quickly returned to profitability.92 As imports shrank, U.S. auto
manufacturers also regained their market shares, significantly increasing their
production in the United States.93 This generated record profits for the domestic
auto industry.94 As the VER restricted the number of imports and reduced the
competition among domestic and foreign auto manufacturers, both domestic and
91. Lochmann, supra note 64, at 108.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 112.
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foreign automakers were able to substantially increase prices. 95 But the
successful recovery of the auto industry also came at a dear price for U.S.
consumers.96 At the same time, even though the outcome was not one that
maximizes total social welfare for the United States, it was arguably the best
response the Reagan Administration could have made given the political and
economic circumstances at the time.
The above analysis demonstrates that when the interests of the exporting
country and the importing country are in harmony, whether the exporting country
has actually compelled the cartel or whether the foreign sovereign is involved in
the cartel becomes irrelevant. The optimal strategy for the United States not only
depends on the payoffs to the United States but also on the strategy of the
exporting country responsible for making the first move in this game. The
strategy of the exporting country in turn depends on its payoffs, which vary
according to the trade policy of the United States as well as many other factors,
including the exporting country's chances of getting challenged for antitrust
violations in the United States, the expected antitrust litigation cost, and the
expected trade loss should the United States impose sanctions. Thus, the optimal
strategy for the United States is by no means fixed. Rather, it is a complicated
assessment of various factors including antitrust, trade, and domestic politics. As
a sequential game, it requires players to consider the future consequences of their
current moves before choosing their actions. Thus, the comity analysis needs to
anticipate these changing circumstances in politics and accommodate such
flexibility.
The United States' response to the Japanese automobile cartel in the 1980s
is not the first time that the United States has used antitrust as a strategic tool for
trade policy. In the 1960s, in anticipation of hostile congressional action that
would have established stringent quotas for steel imports, the U.S. executive
negotiated directly with European steel producers and concluded a series of
voluntary restraint agreements.97 The executive branch bypassed its
governmental counterparts and directly encouraged the European producers to
organize export cartels.98 The government's action was subsequently challenged
in court in Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Rogers.99 The plaintiff
argued that the agreements constituted a violation of the Sherman Act and that
the existing congressional trade legislation preempted the President's power in
the field.100 The district court upheld the steel agreements but noted that the
President had no authority to grant immunity to the foreign exporters
participating in the voluntary agreement.1 01
The U.S. executive branch learned its lesson from Consumers Union and
changed its approach when dealing with trade crises. This explains why the
95. Id. at 109.
96. Id. at 112.
97. Waller, supra note 66, at 107.
98. Id.
99. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319, 1322-23 (D.D.C. 1973).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1323.
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Reagan Administration later encouraged the Japanese government to impose
VER on Japanese automobiles.102 Subsequently, the U.S. government issued
similar assurances to the Japanese government in connection with the imposition
of a VER on semiconductors exported from Japan.lo3 President Reagan again
used these tactics when negotiating with a number of exporting countries on steel
imports, effectuating a trade agreement with Australia in 1985 by allowing the
latter to impose restraints on its steel exports.104 In 2005, the United States and
China signed an agreement in which China promised to place a VER on Chinese
textiles and apparel goods in order to avoid U.S. import duties following a surge
of those Chinese imports to the United States.0 5
2. The Executive's Contrasting Stance
The executive branch's preference for using export cartels as a policy tool
has also been reflected in private antitrust litigation on some occasions. In
Matsushita Electric, two U.S. TV manufacturers brought a case against Japanese
TV manufacturers for creating a cartel in order to drive U.S. competitors out of
the market.10 6 The defendants argued that their conduct should be immune from
antitrust liability because the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) had "mandated agreements fixing minimum export prices" to avoid anti-
dumping liability and retaliatory trade barriers against Japanese goods.'07 In a
statement submitted to court, the MITI admitted that it had directed the Japanese
cartel.0 Moreover, the agency claimed that it could penalize firms for failing to
comply with its directives by using its authority to allocate foreign exchange
under certain foreign trade control laws.109 This position was supported by the
U.S. Solicitor General and the Department of Justice, who urged the court to give
the MITI's statements conclusive weight.110
In its amicus brief, the executive branch strongly endorsed a position of
conclusive deference to the Japanese government:
[C]laims of compulsion are most appropriately entertained when the foreign
government, either directly or through the State Department, informs the court that
the conduct at issue was compelled. It is in such instances the depth of the foreign
government's concern and the possibility of diplomatic friction following from
102. Waller, supra note 66, at 108.
103. Id.
104. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19 & n. 17, Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (No. 83-2004), 1985 WL 669667
[hereinafter United States' Amicus Brief in Matsushita Electric] (citing Letter from J. Paul McGrath,
Assistant Att'y Gen., to Kenneth McDonald, Austl. Charge d'Affaires (Jan. 18, 1985)).
105. See Brown, supra note 27, at 311 & n.27 ("A common resolution to these U.S. and EU
textile and apparel investigations is China frequently agreeing to voluntarily restrain exports and
undertake other grey-area measures-a practice that has been explicitly discouraged in other WTO
Agreements.").
106. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 251 (1983), rev'd sub nom.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
107. Id. at 315
108. Brief for the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4,
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (No. 83-2004).
109. Id. at 14a.
110. United States' Amicus Brief in Matsushita Electric, supra note 104, at 22.
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further court proceedings will be most clearly expressed . . . : Once a foreign
government presents a statement dealing with subjects within its area of sovereign
authority, however, American courts are obligated to accept that statement at face
value; the government's assertions concerning the existence and meaning of its
domestic law generally should be deemed "conclusive." m
The U.S. government's advocacy for deference to a foreign government's
statements in Matsushita Electric contrasts sharply with its staunch objection to
doing so in the Vitamin C Case.112 While this legal inconsistency and logical
incoherence may seem puzzling, it becomes understandable once the underlying
political and economic circumstances are elucidated. The executive branch
explicitly acknowledged these forces in Matsushita Electric: "In a system of
international trade where the United States can be found negotiating for certain
export restraints, failure to recognize a limited sovereign compulsion exception
to the Sherman Act necessarily would 'interfere with delicate foreign relations
conducted by the political branches."'"13
Yet the Third Circuit plainly ignored the executive branch's request and
got bogged down in the complicated factual inquiry of whether compulsion
existed in this case, ultimately refusing to grant immunity to the Japanese
producers.114 The court appears to have overlooked the fact that the Japanese
imposition of export restraints was not a static decision; rather, it was a dynamic
decision involving the trade policy and domestic politics of the United States.
The United States did not act in a vacuum-its judicial decision making an
impact on the Japanese government's actions in the future. Thus, simply focusing
on the antitrust case at issue risks missing the bigger picture of the dynamics
between the United States and Japan.
Indeed, the U.S. government has taken a fluid stance with regard to export
cartels. When a trade remedy is no longer desirable, the executive branch has
tried to persuade U.S. courts to refuse to grant conclusive deference to a foreign
government's statement, as in the Vitamin C Case. Meanwhile, when the
executive branch prioritizes the protection of domestic industries from foreign
competition, it has tried to persuade U.S. courts to treat a foreign government's
statement as conclusive, as in Matsushita Electric. This shows that the basis of
the executive branch's position has not been the law; rather, it has been politics.
Ultimately, the decision on which approach to pursue comes down to assessing
the cost and benefits of using either trade or antitrust remedies-which are
mutually exclusive-in dealing with the conflict.
111. Id. at 23.
112. Id. at 8.
113. Id at 19-20. The United States further contended:
Conversely, the litigation of private antitrust actions could well impede diplomatic efforts to undo foreign
compulsion of anticompetitive conduct. In these circumstances, it is evident that the problems posed by
compelled anticompetitive activity can, as a general matter, better be addressed through the exercise of
executive discretion than by means of the "'[p]iecemeal dispositions' that courts could make" in the course
of private litigation.
Id. (citing First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 786 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
114. See infra Part IV(A).
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m. THE VITAMIN C SAGA
After exploring the political dynamics behind export cartels, I now turn to
the vitamin C litigation, which spanned over a decade and reached all the way to
the U.S. Supreme Court. The drastically different approaches adopted by the
different courts involved in the Vitamin C Case provides a perfect illustration of
the difficulties U.S. courts have faced in dealing with export cartels.
In January 2005, a group of U.S. purchasers filed claims against Chinese
manufacturers of vitamin C, accusing them of fixing prices and limiting the
quantity of sales to the United States.'15 The cases were subsequently
consolidated in a New York federal court.116 The plaintiffs asserted that the
defendants had colluded with the Chamber of Commerce of Medicines and
Health Products Importers and Exporters (Chamber) and agreed to limit the
production of vitamin C and increase its prices to create a supply shortage in the
international market.' 17 The defendants did not deny that they had fixed prices.
However, they contended that they had acted pursuant to Chinese regulations
regarding export pricing and that the Chamber was a government-supervised
entity through which the Chinese government had compelled their collusion.1 19
The defendants then moved to dismiss the claims on account of three defenses
based on comity: (1) the act of state doctrine, under which courts should refrain
from judging the acts of a foreign state; (2) the foreign sovereign compulsion
defense, under which courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases
in which the defendants' conduct is compelled by the government; and (3) the
international comity doctrine, under which courts should decline from exercising
jurisdiction in cases that might influence the working relationships among
nations.120
A. The District Court's Decision
At the heart of the district court's analysis in applying the above comity-
based doctrines is the factual inquiry of "whether the Chinese government
required defendants to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act." 1 21 That is, was
the defendants' behavior actually compelled by a foreign sovereign?'22 In an
unusual move, MOFCOM filed an amicus brief in 2006 in support of the Chinese
defendants and acknowledged that the challenged conduct was directed by a
regulatory pricing scheme.123 As the highest central ministry in charge of
overseeing international trade in China, MOFCOM's appearance in a U.S. court
was unprecedented. 124
115. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (Vitamin C 1I1), 837 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2016).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 180.
118. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 550-52.
121. Id. at 552.
122. Monopolies and Restraints of Trade, 54 AM. JUR. § 334 (2d ed. 2009).
123. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
124. Id. It should be noted, however, that it is common practice for other foreign States to submit
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In its submission, MOFCOM declared that it had created the Chamber in
order to exercise its authority to cut prices and limit the production of vitamin
C.125 MOFCOM explained that the Chamber was a government-supervised
entity, unlike trade associations in the United States. 126 The ministry further
claimed that the penalty for non-compliance with the Chamber's mandate is
severe-the Chamber could provide "warning, open criticism and even
revocation of . .. membership," and may even advise the relevant government
department o suspend or cancel the producers' export rights.127 The district court
asserted that MOFCOM's statements were entitled to substantial deference, but
it found conflicting evidence regarding the compulsion by the Chinese
government.128 The court pointed to the Chamber's statements on its website
which portrayed the exporters as reaching a "self-regulated" agreement to
voluntarily restrict the prices and quantity of exports.129 The court then denied
the defendants' motion to dismiss in order to allow further factual development
on the issue of compulsion.130
In 2009, MOFCOM submitted a new statement to the district court,
clarifying that "[s]elf-discipline does not mean complete voluntariness or self-
conduct" and that such language needs to be read in the context of China's
regulatory culture.'3 1 Nonetheless, the district court accepted the plain language
of the Chamber's documents and refused to defer to MOFCOM's
interpretation.132 After lengthy and detailed discovery, the court found that the
Chinese government merely encouraged the cartel as a policy preference, and
that MOFCOM's conduct did not rise to the level of compelling the vitamin C
manufacturers to fix prices.133 The court also held that even if some compulsion
existed, the defendants went beyond the requirements of the Chinese government
and set prices above those necessary to achieve the government's goals.'34 The
case then went to trial and the jury subsequently decided that the Chinese
defendants had violated U.S. antitrust law and awarded to the plaintiff $54.1
million in damages.135
amicus curiae briefs in antitrust cases before the U.S. courts. See Marek Martyniszyn, Foreign States'
Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Antitrust Cases, 61 ANTITRUST BULL. 611 (2016).
125. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 552-53. According to MOFCOM's
amicus brief, MOFCOM and the State Drug Administration issued a notice mandating strict control of
vitamin C products in 1997 in response to tough competition on the global market.
126. Id. at 552.
127. Id. at 552-54. MOFCOM further explained that the Chamber adopted a new system of
mandatory "advance approval" in 2002, whereby trade associations must sign off on export contracts
before goods can be released for export.
128. Id. at 557.
129. Id. at 554-55.
130. Id.at559.
131. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (Vitamin C II), 810 F. Supp. 2d 522, 532-33 (citing
statement of the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China).
132. Id. at 542.
133. Id. at 525, 550, 552.
134. Id. at 560-61, 566.
135. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (Vitamin C11), 837 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 2016).
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B. The W. T.O. Case and Other Chinese Export Cartels
As the antitrust case against the Chinese vitamin C producers was
progressing in U.S. district court, China received another blow on the trade front.
In 2009, the United States launched a W.T.O. suit against China for violation of
its W.T.O. commitments in imposing export restraints on certain raw
materials.136 Although the W.T.O. proceedings involved different export goods
and a different trade association, the U.S. Trade Representative used
MOFCOM's statements in the Vitamin C Case as evidence that the Chinese
government imposed "minimum export price requirements." 1 The United
States argued that such export restraints violate China's W.T.O. obligations
under the GATT, as well as China's Accession Protocol. These arguments
were upheld by the W.T.O. panel, which ruled in July 2011 that China's export
restraints violated its W.T.O. commitment.13 9
During the trial, the district court considered the W.T.O. proceedings, but
paid little heed to the position of the U.S. Trade Representative. The district court
emphasized that vitamin C was not an export at issue in the W.T.O. proceeding
and that the executive branch had not requested that the court accord
MOFCOM's statements heightened deference.140 While noting the findings of
the W.T.O. panel, the district court held that the panel's conclusion did "not alter
[its] interpretation of Chinese law" because the W.T.O. findings did not show
China's denial of the existence of the price restraint, nor did the W.T.O. discuss
whether the trade association membership had been voluntary or not.14 1 The
district court also observed that the W.T.O. panel failed. to address the
deficiencies with MOFCOM's filings while deferring to its 2009 statements.142
When the Vitamin C Case was pending in front of the district court, several
Chinese manufacturers of magnesite and bauxite faced similar antitrust litigation
for conducting export cartels in the United States.14 3 Similar to the Vitamin C
Case, the defendants in two cases did not deny the charges but sought to dismiss
the suits on the basis of various doctrines addressing actions by foreign
136. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China-Measures Related to
the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WTO Doc. WT/DS394/7 (Nov. 9, 2009).
137. First Written Submission of the United States of America, China-Measures Related to the
Exportation of Various Raw Materials, ¶¶ 207, 208, 216, 229, 352, WT/DS394, WT/DS395, WT/DS398
June 1, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. First Written Submission], http://www.ustr.gov/webfm-send/1948.
138. Id. IM 10-17.
139. See Panel Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
¶¶ 7.185, WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (July 5, 2011) [hereinafter Panel Report],
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/394 395_398re.pdf. However, on appeal from the parties, the
WTO's Appellate Body vacated some of the panel's rulings on the grounds of due process, thus voiding
the panel's findings that the Chinese government had imposed export price restraints. See Appellate Body
Report, supra note 54.
140. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (Vitamin C D1), 810 F. Supp. 2d 522, 551-60 (E.D.N.Y.
2011).
141. Id. at 555-60.
142. Id. at 559-60 & 559 n.49.
143. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat. Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp.
2d 320 (D.N.J. 2010), vacated sub nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462,
(3d Cir. 2011); Resco Prods., Inc. v. Bosai Minerals Grp., No. 06-235, 2010 WL 2331069, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. June 4, 2010).
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governments. ' In the Resco Products case relating to bauxite materials, the
court stayed the proceedings, pending the resolution of the U.S.-initiated W.T.O.
proceedings against China on export constraints for bauxite.14 5 The court
highlighted the striking similarity of factual and legal inquiries between its case
and the W.T.O. proceedings, and exhibited considerable deference to separation
of powers and sovereignty considerations. 146 Meanwhile, in the Animal Science
case relating to magnesite, the district court in New Jersey afforded "a nearly
binding-degree of deference" to MOFCOM's statements.147 The court also
actively researched evidence from other proceedings that might bear on the
compulsion defense raised by the defendants, including Resco Products and the
Vitamin C Case.148 In the end, the court was convinced by the totality of the
evidence that the trade association involved was a government entity, and that
the Chinese government had indeed compelled the defendants' conduct.14 9
Thus, the district court's decision in the Vitamin C Case represents a clear
departure from the more deferential approach taken by the courts in the raw
material cases, giving rise to confusion about the standards that courts apply in
deciding how to deal with comity-related defense. Indeed, the district court's
decision in the Vitamin C Case generated controversy, as many commentators
criticized the court for its failure to consider the decision's implications on
American trade policy.150
C. The Second Circuit's Decision
On appeal, the Second Circuit applied a ten-factor balancing test in
evaluating whether the district court should abstain from exercising its
jurisdiction on international comity grounds. 151 Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's
ruling in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, the Second Circuit focused
primarily on the first factor, that is, the degree of conflict between the U.S. and
foreign law.' 52 Instead of focusing its analysis on a factual inquiry into the
existence of compulsion by the Chinese government, the Second Circuit gave
144. Resco Prods., 2010 WL 2331069, at *3. See also Animal Sci. Prods., 702 F. Supp. 2d at
429-37; Wang, supra note 34, at 1121-24.
145. Resco Prods., 2010 WL 2331069, at *3, *6.
146. Id. at *6.
147. Animal Sci. Prods., 702 F. Supp. 2d at 426. (The court considered that "a foreign sovereign's
admission of legal compulsion of its subjects could warrant a nearly binding-degree of deference, even if
the admitted compulsion was based on what might be deemed, in American jurisprudence, a form of
'unwritten law."')
148. Id. at 403-18.
149. Id. at 437.
150. See Michael N. Sohn & Jesse Solomon, Lingering Questions on Foreign Sovereignty and
Separation of Powers After the Vitamin C Price-Fixing Verdict, 28 ANTITRUST 78, 83 (2013). See
generally Wang, supra note 34.
151. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (Vitamin C Ill), 837 F.3d 175, 184-85 (2d Cir. 2016)
(relying upon the balancing test set out by the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am.,
749 F.2d 1378 (1984), and the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 610 F. 2d
1059, 1979, the courts in both of which weighed the interests of the United States against the
countervailing interests of the foreign entity when determining whether to exert jurisdiction over
extraterritorial conduct affecting U.S. commerce).
152. Id. at 192-95.
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conclusive deference to the official statements by MOFCOM.1 5 3 The Second
Circuit asserted that it was unable to identify a single case "where a foreign
sovereign appeared before a U.S. tribunal and the U.S. tribunal adopted a reading
of that sovereign's law contrary to that sovereign's interpretation of them."1
54
The appellate court continued: "Not extending deference in these circumstances
disregards and unravels the tradition of according respect to a foreign
government's explication of its own laws, the same respect and treatment that
we would expect our government to receive in comparable matters before a
foreign court."155 In a footnote, the court also mentioned the counterfactual-
had the Chinese government not chosen to appear in the litigation, the district
court's fact-specific approach would have been entirely appropriate.156 Thus, it
appears that the Chinese government's appearance in this case played a decisive
role in influencing the outcome.
Notably, the Second Circuit's decision also included a lengthy recitation of
the adverse consequences that had resulted from the district court's disregard of
MOFCOM's statements.5 7 Thus, it appears that the Chinese government's
reaction was one of the important components of the court's comity analysis.
Ultimately, the Second Circuit reversed the decision of the lower court.
D. The Supreme Court Decision
In April 2017, the plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court, asking the Court to clarify, among others, two important issues. The
first issue presented concerned the level of deference given to a foreign
government's interpretation of its own law-specifically, whether a U.S. court
should give conclusive deference to a foreign government's interpretation of its
own law if the government has appeared in court.160 The second issue presented
concerned the longstanding split among circuit courts in how to apply the
international comity doctrine. In this case, the Second Circuit applied the
balancing test adopted by the Ninth and Third Circuits, selecting the test over
153. Id. at 186-94 (noting that U.S. courts are bound to defer to such official statements when a
foreign government directly participates in a U.S. court proceeding and there is reasonable evidence
presented under the circumstances).
154. Id.
15 5. Id.
156. Id. at 191 n.10 ("We note that if the Chinese Government had not appeared in this litigation,
the district court's careful and thorough treatment of the evidence before it in analyzing what Chinese law
required at both the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages would have been entirely
appropriate.").
157. Id. at 193-94.
158. Id. (arguing that he court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction in this case because
the Chinese government had filed a formal statement admitting the compulsion and because the
defendants could not simultaneously comply with Chinese law and U.S. antitrust law).
159. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Animal Sci. Prods. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct.
1865 (2018) (No. 16-1220), 2017 WL 1353281 [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari]; see also Reply to
Brief in Opposition, Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865
(2018) (No. 16-1220), 2017 WL 2610072 [hereinafter Reply to Brief in Opposition].
160. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 159, at 29-34; see also Reply to Brief in
Opposition, supra note 159, at 11-12.
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different versions employed in other circuits.161 On June 26, 2017, the Supreme
Court invited Acting Solicitor General Jeffery Wall to file a brief expressing the
views of the United States in the Vitamin C Case.162 The U.S. Solicitor General
and the Department of Justice subsequently submitted their amicus brief to the
Supreme Court in November 2017, arguing that the Second Circuit had erred by
treating MOFCOM's statements as conclusive.163
In its brief, the U.S. government relied heavily on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 44.1, which was adopted in 1966 to assist courts in determining issues
concerning foreign law.16 4 The government highlighted two aspects of Rule 44.1.
First, the determination of foreign law is a "question of law" for the courts rather
than a question of fact.165 Second, the Court may consider any relevant material
or sources in determining foreign law.166 This affords federal courts great
flexibility.167 In addition, the U.S. government argued that federal courts should
not treat foreign governments' characterizations as conclusive in all
circumstances.168 The executive branch enumerated a list of factors that courts
should consider when weighing a foreign government's statements, including
"the statement's clarity, thoroughness, and support; its context and purpose; the
authority of the entity making it; its consistency with past statements; and any
other corroborating or contradictory evidence."'69 The brief then noted that the
Second Circuit disregarded other relevant materials, including China's
representation to the W.T.O. that it had given up export administration of vitamin
C. 17 0 Further, the brief disagreed with the Second Circuit's interpretation of the
previous case law, arguing that not "every submission by a foreign government
is entitled to the same weight."'7 ' Last but not least, the brief disputed the Second
Circuit's concerns about reciprocity, stating that the United States has never
argued before foreign courts that they are bound to accept its characterizations
of U.S. law. 172
The final decision of the U.S. Supreme Court was exactly in line with that
proposed by the executive branch. In fact, the reasoning and arguments in the
Court's final ruling were strikingly similar to those proposed in the government's
amicus brief, and in some places it seems to be copied verbatim. 17 Such strong
161. Reply to Brief in Opposition, supra note 159, at 12 ("Five circuits each employ five distinct
versions of such a 'balancing test,' each considering anywhere from three to ten factors.").
162. Shepard Goldfein & James Keyte, Vitamin C Litigation: Window into Trump White House
International Relations? N.Y.L.J. (July 18, 2017), http://www.law.com/newyorklawjoumal/
almID/1202793176725/?slreturn=20170931015948.
163. See United States' Amicus Brief in Vitamin C Case, supra note 60, at 9.
164. Id. at 6.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 6-7.
167. Id. at 7.
168. Id. at 8.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 10.
171. Id. at 11.
172. Id. at 11-12.
173. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1867-75 (2018).
Just as the government did, the Court first referred to Rule 44.1, arguing that federal courts should treat
foreign law as a question of law rather than a question of fact, and that courts are entitled to consider other
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resemblance between the Supreme Court's decision and the amicus brief shows
that the Court adopted a highly deferential approach to the executive branch in
deciding this case. This represents a fundamental shift from the previous case
law, in which courts tended to focus on the factual issue of whether a foreign
sovereign had compelled the cartel. As will be illustrated in Part IV, facts are
often messy and difficult to ascertain. Even when a foreign government has
appeared in U.S. courts to offer its interpretation of its own law, courts still
struggle to define a limit for determining whether the foreign sovereign's
involvement constituted compulsion.
IV. THE JUDICIAL CHALLENGE WITH EXPORT CARTELS
Against the backdrop of the Vitamin C Case, I now explain why the focus
on factual evidence of a foreign sovereign's involvement in export cartels has
posed a perennial challenge to U.S. courts deciding such cases. To cope with
such challenges, I propose a legal framework of comity analysis for courts to
optimally respond to export cartel cases, particularly when the facts are uncertain
and difficult to discern.
A. Judicial Frustrations with Facts
In export cartel cases, a focal point of the litigation is the issue of whether
foreign sovereign compulsion exists. This problem frequently poses a significant
challenge for courts, since the information gap between the exporting country
and the importing country is often very wide. Cartels are often conducted secretly
and it is difficult to obtain evidence of the cartel's formation. Moreover, because
export cartels are organized extraterritorially, it is even more difficult for the
importing countries to detect the existence of such cartels. When defendants
attempt to invoke a comity-related defense, U.S. courts and agencies face the
additional task of understanding foreign laws and legal practices. The Second
Circuit highlighted some of these challenges in its opinion on the Vitamin C
Case. For instance, the court observed that Chinese law is less transparent han
that in the United States and other countries. 174 Moreover, the court also noted
that the Chinese legal system is distinct from the U.S. system, and that it has a
vast regime of administrative regulation.175 It found that the plain language of
materials or sources in ascertaining foreign law. The Court also outlined a number of considerations in
evaluating the foreign government's submission, and they are almost the same as those outlined in the
government's amicus brief. The Court similarly was persuaded by the goverenment's observation that the
Second Circuit had improperly disregarded other evidence, noting China's submission to the WTO that it
had given up export administration of vitamin C at the end of 2001. The Court further noted that the
Second Circuit had misperceived its decision in United States v. Pink, stating that the outcome of Pink
was grounded on the specific circumstances of that case. Additionally, the Court pointed out that the
United States had never demanded that foreign courts be bound to treat its characterizations of U.S. laws
as conclusive so reciprocity should not be a concern. In the end, the Court referred to two international
treaties-the European Convention on Information on Foreign Law and the Inter-American Convention
on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law, both of which were also quoted in the amicus brief of the
executive branch.
174. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (Vitamin CII), 837 F.3d 175, 190 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting
In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)).
175. Id.
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the government's directive may not accurately reflect Chinese law, especially
considering the need for translation and the understanding of the term of arts in
the Chinese system.76 When the foreign government has not imposed any
mandatory law, there is further ambiguity as to whether the government has
actually compelled the action.
In practice, there have been two means through which courts have tried to
fill the information gap. One is through trial discovery. However, factual
evidence is often ambiguous due to the covertness of the cartels and, sometimes,
the foreign state's deliberate attempt o disguise its imposition of export
restraints to avoid potential trade violations. When foreign sovereigns appear in
court to provide their own characterization of their law, judges also differ
significantly in deciding the degree of deference to afford such foreign
statements.
1. The Difficulty of a Fact-Specific Approach
Trial discovery is the essential means for a fact-specific approach. But trial
discovery is a costly and lengthy process. Moreover, ambiguities abound as to
the authority of the government's directive and the severity of the sanctions. As
Spencer Weber Waller acutely observed: "[t]he interaction between
governments and private firms can be understood as a spectrum, ranging from
sanctions to purely voluntary requests with no sanctions at all." 17 7 In practice,
U.S. courts have been unclear about the required threshold for a foreign
sovereign's involvement in the cartels and have taken divergent approaches to
deciding these cases.178
The complex factual circumstances of the Chinese Vitamin C Case offer a
good illustration of the difficulties faced by courts in trying to uncover the
conditions of compulsion. There is no doubt that the Chamber was closely
involved and facilitated the formation of the cartel, but it is not entirely clear
whether the government had compelled the cartel. MOFCOM claimed that the
Chamber was government-supervised and that the appointment of its staff was
government-controlled.1 79 It described the Chamber as "the instrumentality
through which the Ministry oversees and regulates the business of importing and
exporting medicinal products in China."'80 However, plaintiffs challenged the
Ministry's position, arguing that the Chamber was only a non-governmental
organization independent from the government.181 To buttress their claims, the
plaintiffs submitted evidence of the Chinese government's previous public
176. Id. at 190-91 (quoting In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (Vitamin CII), 810 F. Supp. 2d 522,
542 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)).
177. See Spencer Weber Waller, Redefining the Foreign Compulsion Defense in U.S. Antitrust
Law: The Japanese Auto Restraints and Beyond, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 747, 795 (1982).
178. See Bradshaw et al., supra note 9.
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statements extolling the independence of the Chamber.1 82
Another vexing issue is the difficulty for a court in drawing the line
between voluntary and compulsive conduct. For instance, upon learning that the
EU was contemplating anti-dumping actions against the Chinese producers of
vitamin C in the fall of 2011, MOFCOM gave specific instructions to the
Chamber to organize firms to take active steps to avoid potential anti-dumping
challenges.18 3 The Chamber subsequently coordinated a meeting with the
defendants.184 However, there is no indication in the minutes of the meetings that
the Chamber had compelled these defendants to abide by a minimum export
price.1s Rather, according to the court's findings, the minutes suggest that the
agreement among them was voluntary.186
Further, there was confusion as to whether the Chamber was able to
successfully enforce the price scheme, as claimed by MOFCOM in its brief
submitted to the district court, given the lack of clear penalties and sanctions for
non-compliance. The district court pointed out several ambiguities in
MOFCOM's official statements that raised doubts about the government's
compulsion.1 87 For instance, the briefings and discovery revealed that firms were
entitled to export vitamin C even if they were not members of a subcommittee
of the Chamber.!88 During a meeting held by the Chamber, a representative from
MOFCOM admitted that the government's regulation of the vitamin C industry
"ha[d] not been very successful."89 In addition to "maximizing their profits," he
urged the companies to also "consider the interest of the state as a whole." 190
There was also evidence showing that those manufacturers who deviated from
the agreed minimum price did not incur any punishment.191
Additionally, there was confusion as to whether the parties actually went
significantly above the quoted price.1 92 The district court found that, while the
Chamber had been charged with the responsibility to coordinate export prices to
avoid anti-dumping suits and below-cost pricing, the firms themselves enjoyed
significant discretion in determining their profit margins, and the Ministry in
practice did not intervene.1 93 Therefore, the court believed that any compulsion
was limited to avoiding anti-dumping and below-cost pricing.194 The district
court noted that he Chinese government had asserted in the W.T.O. proceedings
that it had repealed the price restraint system and ceased to impose penalty as of
182. Id.
183. Id. at 534.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 533 n.11.
186. Id. at 534.
187. Id. at 557.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 534.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 536.
192. Id. at 560-561.
193. Id. at 561.
194. Id. at 560-61.
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May 28, 2008.195 The Chinese government also asserted in the W.T.O.
proceedings that it had given up the "export administration" of vitamin C as of
January 1, 2002.96 This apparently contradicts MOFCOM's position in the
vitamin C litigation.197 All these factual inconsistencies ultimately led the district
court to refuse to defer to MOFCOM's statements. In its denial of summary
judgment, the court described MOFCOM's 2009 statement as "a carefully
crafted and phrased litigation position."199 The district court even portrayed
MOFCOM's assertion of compulsion as "a post-hoc attempt to shield
defendants' conduct from antitrust scrutiny."200
The difficulty of a factual inquiry into compulsion is not unique to cases
involving Chinese exporters. Since the 1980s, the Japanese government has used
administrative guidance, a common administrative scheme applied by the MITI,
201to actively encourage the formation of export cartels. Administrative guidance
per se is not government regulation, the enforcement of which does not
202necessitate legal authority. Rather, it refers to the function of an administrative
agency to persuade and guide a party to conduct its business in a certain way.203
According to Japanese trade specialists, administrative guidance is "the core
around which all the legal measures for export control revolve." 204
Administrative guidance has worked well in Japan, and the MITI has been very
successful in achieving compliance with its administrative requests. 205
At least two factors have contributed to its success. First, Japanese culture
places an emphasis on cooperation and avoidance of direct conflicts. 206
Moreover, Japanese industries usually comply with such informal requests and
guidance.207 Second, some Japanese administrative agencies enjoy a wide range
208of statutory powers. For example, during the 1980s, the MITI, the agency in
charge of overseeing international trade in Japan, was responsible for enforcing
about 130 statutes encompassing a wide variety of administrative matters from
trade to safety standards to pollution control.209 Businesses thus feared retaliation
195. Id. at 527.
196. Id. at 532.
197. Id. at 552 ("China's representation to the WTO that it gave up 'export administration ... of
vitamin C' as of January 1, 2002 is further reason not to defer to the Ministry's position. Although many
of the public statements cited by the Stern Report are, as the Ministry asserts, simply general descriptions
of the current status of China's economy and China's transition toward a market economy, the Ministry
makes no attempt to explain China's representations that it gave up export administration of vitamin C,
which appear to contradict the Ministry's position in the instant litigation.").
198. Id. at 552.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Lochmann, supra note 64, at 146.
202. Id. See also Mitsuo Matsushita, The Legal Framework of Trade and Investment in Japan,
27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 361, 376 (1986).
203. Lochmann, supra note 64, at 146.
204. Matsushita, supra note 202, at 375.
205. Lochmann, supra note 64, at 146.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 146-47.
208. Matsushita, supra note 202, at 377.
209. Id.
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from the MITI should they fail to comply with its directives.210 According to
Japanese scholars, a refusal to comply with administrative guidance may
provoke the government to establish formal requests or even cause businesses to
face unfavorable treatments in various ways.211 This poses difficulties even for
Japanese courts in deciding whether such compliance with administrative
guidance is a valid defense for violations of Japanese antitrust laws.2 12
Matsushita Electric offers another example of the challenges that courts
have faced in trying to define the boundary between voluntary and compulsive
conduct. 213 In this case, a group of U.S. television producers attacked a number
of Japanese companies, alleging that they had conspired with one another to
monopolize the U.S. market by selling televisions at artificially low prices.
However, after an eight-year discovery period, during which the parties
produced thousands of documents and took hundreds of depositions, the Third
Circuit was still unable to determine whether the cartel was compelled by the
Japanese government or initiated by the companies of their own accord. 214 Since
the Third Circuit was unable to find that the MITI had imposed a mandatory
price restraint on the exporters, it held that the Japanese regulatory scheme
"merely provide[d] an umbrella" that allowed for the domestic antitrust
exemption.215 The court found ample evidence demonstrating that the defendants
departed from the agreed prices in an attempt to conceal their actions from the
MITI.216 Yet the court was unable to identify any evidence showing that the
defendants' collusion had originated with the compulsion of the Japanese
government; in fact, it concluded that the defendants' conduct had violated
Japanese domestic law.217 The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
2 18
However, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, and bypassed the
opportunity to address the issue of compulsion in its final ruling.219
As illustrated in the Vitamin C Case and Matsushita Electric, the
challenges for courts in taking the fact-specific approach lie in the inherent
difficulty of identifying the extent of State control over domestic companies.220
On the one hand, even if the State imposes a mandatory export restraint over its
own companies, it may fail to coordinate an export cartel. After all, firms that
participate in a cartel may have incentives to cheat in order to line their pockets.
Thus, the effectiveness of the State's policing system directly impacts the
success of the State-led cartel. On the other hand, the State is no ordinary legal
210. Id.
211. Lochmann, supra note 64, at 147 -48
212. Id.
213. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 315 (3d Cit. 1983).
214. United States' Amicus Brief in Matsushita Electric, supra note 104.
215. In re Japanese Elec., 723 F.2d at 315.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 471 U.S. 1002 (1985).
219. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 598 (1985).
220. See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and
Chinese Firms, 103 GEO. L.J. 665 (2015). See generally Angela Huyue Zhang, The Antitrust Paradox of
China Inc., 50 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 159 (2017) (discussing the European Commission's treatment of
common ownership in Chinese SOEs in the energy sector).
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actor. Even if the State does not issue any binding administrative law or order, it
can threaten to penalize a firm if the firm does not voluntarily comply with the
State's request. In other words, the State could have de facto control over the
firms, even without clear de jure control. In the Vitamin C Case, neither
MOFCOM nor any other government department imposed a mandatory
requirement on the Chinese manufacturers to coordinate prices, but the Chinese
government may have been able to obtain de facto control over these exporters
via other administrative means. However, the extent of such de facto control is
very difficult for a court to discern through discovery.
2. The Shortcut ofDeference
The other means by which the U.S. courts can fill in the information gap is
to rely on the foreign sovereign's interpretation of its own law. The simplest way
for the exporting country to convey information to the United States is by directly
communicating with it. But in a game of strategy, players may be concerned that
the other is mendacious or may not take them at their words. If the exporting
country and the United States have perfectly aligned interests, then direct
communication can be successful. If the exporting country confesses to having
compelled the export cartel, then the United States should grant immunity to the
exporters. If, on the other hand, the exporting country denies compulsion, the
United States should deny immunity to the exporters accordingly. In most
circumstances, however, the exporting country and the United States may not
have perfectly aligned interests; they may have only partially aligned interests or
even completely conflicting interests. Moreover, in the game between the
exporting country and the United States, the former may have an incentive to
protect its domestic manufacturers who have solicited government statements in
the hope of receiving immunity from antitrust liabilities. This is especially true
if the direct communication from the exporting country has zero or negligible
direct cost, which is known as "cheap talk" in economics.221 The United States
is aware of such incentives for foreign governments to lie and, thus, will not fully
trust the words of the exporting country.
At the same time, a foreign government hat has imposed export restraints,
either formally or informally, on domestic producers would have the incentive
to admit that it has imposed export restraints and coordinated the export cartels.
The Chinese Vitamin C Case offers a case in point. Without question, such an
admission carries some cost for China; however, it can potentially also help
Chinese exporters evade antitrust violations. The Chinese government and
Chinese exporters are engaged in a repeated game. As such, the players will
interact with each other in the future, and they will need to consider the impact
of their current action on the future actions of other players. If the Chinese
government refuses to defend its domestic firms in U.S. courts, it would lose its
credibility among Chinese exporters. Knowing that the government would not
bail them out from antitrust liabilities, the exporters would be less likely to
221. See generally Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSPS. 103 (1996)
(describing the goals and outcomes of communications that do not directly affect payoffs).
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comply with the government's instructions in the future. To appear credible and
reliable, the Chinese government is disposed to defend Chinese manufacturers.
This is not to say that the Chinese government may not have an incentive to
shield its domestic manufacturers from antitrust liabilities even if it has not really
imposed such export restraints.222 However, other things being equal, the
Chinese government is strongly inclined to defend its own firms in cases of
genuine State-led export cartels, as the failure to do so will hurt its credibility
among domestic exporters.
Before the Supreme Court's decision in the Vitamin C Case, case law was
unclear as to the legal weight of a characterization of foreign laws by their
governments. In its United States v. Pink decision in 1942, the Court considered
a case regarding the extraterritorial reach of a decree nationalizing Russia's
insurance business.223 The Court regarded the Russian government's declaration
as conclusive evidence of the effects of the decree and did not stop to review
other evidence.224 Several courts, including the Third Circuit and the Fifth
Circuit, applied Pink to declare that official declarations from foreign
,225
governments must be accepted as "conclusive." Meanwhile, the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission held that such foreign statements
are sufficient to establish compulsion, stating that "the representation must
contain enough detail to enable the Agencies to see precisely how the
compulsion would be accomplished under foreign law." 226
On the other hand, many lower courts continued to hold that such
statements need not be accepted as conclusive. For instance, the Sixth Circuit227
and D.C. Circuit228 have performed independent analyses of foreign law,
regardless of a foreign sovereign's contrary arguments.22 9 The Eleventh Circuit
held that while a foreign government's amicus brief is a logical place to look for
reliable and accurate information, it is not entitled to conclusive deference.230
222. See Martyniszyn, supra note 5, at 307 (observing that foreign export firms may lobby their
home States to secure an ex post statement to the effect that they were compelled by the government o
fix prices).
223. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
224. Id. at 218-20.
225. D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd, 564 F.2d
89 (3d Cir. 1977) ("The principle of Pink requires this Court to accept the opinion of the attorney general
of Mexico as an official declaration by that government that the effect of the expropriation decree was to
extinguish Papantla's royalty and participating rights in the expropriated oil."); see also Delgado v. Shell
Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1363 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that
the Department of Justice of the Republic of the Philippines submitted an opinion articulating the scope
and effect of a law of the Philippines and such statements were accepted as conclusive).
226. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT AND COOPERATION § 4.2.2 (Jan. 13, 2017).
227. Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 495-96 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the argument that the
Sixth Circuit was bound to defer to the arguments filed in the Republic of El Salvador's amicus brief).
228. McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 941 (2002), vacated in part on other grounds, 320 F.3d 280 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(rejecting Iran's contention that its corporate law requires hareholders to physically appear at the firm's
office to collect dividends).
229. Reply to Brief in Opposition at 6, In re Vitamin C Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (No. 16-1220).




The Seventh Circuit has also applied a flexible standard of deference. In In re
Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, the court deferred to a foreign sovereign's
proffered interpretation of its own law only because the foreign government had
appeared in federal court and its interpretation was both plausible and consistent
with its stated views throughout many years of domestic and international
litigation on the subject. 231 Similarly, in a previous decision relating to
statements by the Indonesian government, the Second Circuit concluded that the
government's amicus brief was entitled to substantial deference but did not take
232
it as conclusive evidence of compulsion. Notably, this ruling contrasts with its
reasoning in the Vitamin C Case, in which the Second Circuit firmly held that a
U.S. court is bound to defer to the statements of a foreign government when it
"directly participates in a U.S. court proceeding," and its interpretation is
"reasonable under the circumstances presented."233
Even though the Supreme Court's decision in the Vitamin C Case has
clarified that U.S. courts are not bound to treat such statements as conclusive,
the question remains: when the factual evidence is ambiguous, how should courts
set the benchmark for determining whether a foreign sovereign's involvement in
the cartel has risen to the level of compulsion? As explained below, the judicial
focus on facts tends to obscure the fundamental question of whether granting a
comity-based defense to the foreign exporters is in fact in the best interest of the
United States.
B. The Optimal Judicial Response
As illustrated by the U.S. government's contrasting stance in regard to
Japanese export cartels in the 1980s and in the recent Vitamin C Case, the
optimal response to export cartels is not fixed as a specific formula. Rather, it is
contingent upon the changing political and economic conditions. Thus, U.S.
courts should be aware of the risks that their judgments in State-led export cartel
cases could create for international relations, especially when the underlying
factual circumstances are unclear. However, courts are not institutionally well
equipped to make such a cost-benefit analysis. In her remarks at an antitrust
conference, Judge Diane Wood, Chief Justice of the Seventh Circuit,
acknowledged that it is extremely difficult to ask a court to administer comity as
234the court's hands are often tied. This implies that U.S. courts should generally
defer to the position of the executive branch, which possesses the foreign
expertise and is in the best position to balance competing interests.
Indeed, in cases involving foreign relations, U.S. courts have traditionally
231. In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1312-13 (7th Cir. 1992).
232. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 313 F.3d
70, 92 (2d Cir. 2002).
233. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (Vitamin C11), 837 F.3d 175, 189 (2d Cir. 2016).
234. Chief Justice Diane P. Wood, Keynote Speech: What's the Role of Comity in the
International Antitrust Enforcement?, in CONCURRENCES REVIEw & GW LAW, EXTRATERRITORIALITY
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accorded a high level of deference to the executive branch, which is in a superior
position to determine strategies for the United States in such cases.235 Prominent
legal scholars including Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein have proposed extending
the Chevron deference doctrine to executive actions related to international
236affairs. In a seminal article, they argue that U.S. courts should only defer to
foreign sovereigns' interests after a careful assessment of the consequences.237
More specifically, they observe that the cost of deference is the loss of American
control over certain regulatory activities.238 In the context of export cartels,
granting immunity to foreign producers on the basis of comity implies that the
United States would cede control over antitrust regulations, compromising the
interests of U.S. consumers. On the other hand, Posner and Sunstein also suggest
that the benefits of deference include reciprocal gains from the foreign
government's deference to American regulations and the reduction of potential
tension with the foreign country.239 In the context of export cartels, there could
be other benefits, such as the bailing out of failing domestic producers and the
sheltering of them from foreign competition, as illustrated in the Japanese xport
cartel cases.
This approach of deferring to the executive branch would greatly simplify
the current case law, which has focused too narrowly on the foreign sovereign
compulsion issue. As shown in the Japanese export cartel cases, a foreign
sovereign's involvement in the cartels may not even be relevant. Indeed, in
certain political and economic circumstances, it might be in the best interest of
the United States to encourage export cartels. In fact, the U.S. government
concluded a number of VER agreements directly with foreign steel producers in
the 1960s, bypassing their governmental counterparts. Nor is the appearance of
the foreign sovereign in the U.S. court necessarily decisive, as shown in the
Vitamin C Case. The deference analysis ultimately turns on the government's
determination of whether the harm on foreign relations as a result of the refusal
to defer to the foreign government will outweigh the harm done to domestic
consumers if foreign producers are exempt from antitrust litigation.
In practice, in cases involving State-led export cartels, the executive branch
may have already initiated actions against the foreign sovereign or the foreign
exporters, either through trade or antitrust. Therefore, U.S. courts' optimal
responses should not be static, rather, they must take into account the specific
steps the executive branch has undertaken with regard to the export cartels. More
specifically, I propose the following legal framework of comity analysis when
235. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 1170, 1202 (2007) ("[Courts] say that the executive has expertise and flexibility, can keep secrets,
can efficiently monitor developments, and can act quickly and decisively; the other branches cannot.");
see also Daniel Abebe & Eric Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 507, 508
(2011).
236. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 235, at 1204-05 (arguing that the executive is well-
placed to resolve difficult foreign policy questions requiring judgments of policy and principle, and that




312 [Vol. 44: 2
Strategic Comity
courts face inconsistent and ambiguous factual evidence in export cartel cases.
Scenario 1. Has the executive branch brought suit against the foreign
exporters for antitrust violations? The executive branch is in a superior position
to weigh the costs and benefits of its actions on foreign relations. Therefore, its
decision to initiate an antitrust suit sends a strong signal that it deems the
challenged conduct to be more harmful to the United States than the
corresponding harm to foreign relations from the antitrust lawsuit.24 If a U.S.
court endorses a comity-based defense in such a circumstance, it would directly
conflict with the position of the executive branch and undermine the
government's efforts to protect domestic consumer welfare.
Scenario 2. Has the executive branch negotiated with the foreign sovereign
to impose export restraints to accommodate the desires of the United States? If
so, U.S. courts should refrain from reaching a ruling that might undermine the
efforts of the U.S. executive branch. Under unique political circumstances, the
United States could negotiate for VER agreements to avoid potentially more
drastic legislative responses to foreign exports. Foreign governments may not
agree to coordinate with the U.S. government unless the latter gives adequate
assurances that comity defense would be available, and exporting companies
would not be found liable under U.S. antitrust law. In such a circumstance, a
comity-based defense such as foreign sovereign compulsion is of critical
importance for the United States and the foreign governments to establish the
VER agreements.
Scenario 3. Has the U.S. government tried to persuade the foreign
sovereign to abandon export restraints via diplomatic means or through other
multilateral treaty networks, such as the W.T.O? As diplomacy and trade are
nimbler and more efficient than antitrust litigation in resolving conflicts between
exporting and importing countries, U.S. courts should refrain from making
decisions that might impede such efforts. Indeed, in Resco Products, the U.S.
district court suspended the antitrust suit to await the resolution of such disputes
through diplomatic means or trade remedies.
Scenario 4. If the executive branch has not taken any action through trade
or antitrust, U.S. courts are well advised to solicit opinions from the executive
branch. In the Vitamin C Case, the Second Circuit chose to defer to MOFCOM's
statements for fear of creating international tension with the Chinese
government. The Second Circuit however, had attempted to make such a
judgment on international relations on its own. As the executive branch's amicus
brief to the Supreme Court revealed, in this case, the executive branch did not
appear to believe that the harms of not granting deference to the Chinese
government outweighed American interests in the prosecution of antitrust
violations. In this regard, the Supreme Court made exactly the right move by
proactively soliciting opinions from the executive branch before making its final
decision.
240. United States' Amicus Brief in Matsushita Electric, supra note 104, at 23.
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
In this Article, I attempt to draw. upon the insights from game theory to
unravel the complicated dynamics between the importing and exporting country
in export cartel cases. In deciding on how to respond to State-led export cartels,
the United States does not act alone. Its choices closely interact with the
decisions of the exporting country, whose conduct implicates the interests of the
United States. The optimal strategy of the United States is contingent on the
strategy of the exporting country, whose strategy is also dependent on both the
United States' and its own domestic politics and trade policy. Accordingly, the
United States' best response to a State-led export cartel not only turns on a
calculation of its own payoffs from competition, trade, and politics, but also on
a careful assessment of the strategic moves of the exporting country. Comity
analysis, therefore, needs to be robust enough to accommodate and adapt to
changing economic and political circumstances.
However, much of the judicial response to State-led export cartels has been
static, and judges have failed to appreciate the dynamic features of these cases.
Judges have also tended to fix their attention on the factual issue of compulsion,
while giving inadequate consideration to other dimensions, such as trade and
politics. But whether a U.S. court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction
and defer to the interests of the foreign sovereign should depend on the specific
circumstances of the particular case, taking into consideration the interests of all
players involved, while recognizing the strategic nature of their decision-
making. Because the executive branch is in the best position to reconcile
competing interests, I contend that U.S. courts should accord a high level of
deference to the executive branch in cases involving State-led export cartels. The
Supreme Court's recent decision in the Vitamin C Case, in which the Court
appears to have accorded deference to the executive branch, offers a prime
example of a pragmatic judicial resolution of such cases. Viewed in this light,
the Supreme Court's decision not only represents a major step forward in
clarifying the existing case law on export cartels but also signals the judicial
trend towards deference with regard to future comity-related cases.
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